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	NOTE 
Setting a Better Standard: Evaluating Jail 
Officials’ Constitutional Duties in Preventing 
the Sexual Assault of Pretrial Detainees 
Walton v. Dawson, 752 F.3d 1109 (8th Cir. 2014). 
BLAIR A. BOPP* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
According to a recent survey of American federal and state inmates, 4.5 
percent of the nation’s prisoners – roughly 60,500 people – reported experi-
encing sexual violence while in prison.1  The Supreme Court has stressed that 
“[b]eing violently assaulted in prison is simply not ‘part of the penalty that 
criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.’”2  Congress re-
sponded to this ongoing problem by enacting the Prison Rape Elimination 
Act (“PREA”) in 2003.3  PREA established a zero-tolerance standard for 
prison sexual assault and mandated the United States Department of Justice to 
make the prevention of such assault a top priority in American prisons.4 
Jail and prison officials have a duty to protect inmates under their su-
pervision from being subject to violence at the hands of fellow inmates.5  
When employees of a jail do not adhere to the jailhouse policy of locking the 
cell doors each night and an inmate is sexually assaulted by another inmate as 
a result, a question arises as to who is culpable for the breach of safety.6  
However, just because a jailhouse policy has been violated does not mean the 
 
*  B.A., University of Missouri, 2011; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School 
of Law, 2016; Associate Member, Missouri Law Review, 2014-2015.  Special thanks 
to Professor Rodney Uphoff, Mr. Stephen Wyse, and the editorial board of the Mis-
souri Law Review for their assistance in the writing and editing of this Note. 
 1. Pat Kaufman, Prison Rape: Research Explores Prevalence, Prevention, 
NAT’L INST. JUST. (Mar. 2008), http://www.nij.gov/journals/259/Pages/prison-
rape.aspx#back1. 
 2. JOHN W. PALMER, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF PRISONERS 745 (Routledge, 
ed., 9th ed. 2015) (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)); see also 
ROBERT E. TOONE, PROTECTING YOUR HEALTH AND SAFETY: A LITIGATION GUIDE 
FOR INMATES 53 (Daniel Manville, ed., 2nd ed. 2009), available at http://www.splce-
nter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/pdf/static/pyhs_chapter_5.pdf. 
 3. Kaufman, supra note 1. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Walton v. Dawson, 752 F.3d 1109, 1120 (8th Cir. 2014) [hereinafter Walton 
II] (quoting Spruce v. Sargent, 149 F.3d 783, 785 (8th Cir. 1998)). 
 6. Id. at 1115. 
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inmate has suffered a violation of his constitutional rights.7  It is when the 
policy equates to a constitutional minimum, given the totality of the circum-
stances, that the court properly considers the breach of policy to amount to a 
constitutional deprivation.8 
This Note examines Walton v. Dawson, a recent Eighth Circuit decision 
that considers whether jail officials should be held accountable when an in-
mate-on-inmate sexual assault occurs and the assault was directly facilitated 
by the failure of the officials’ subordinates to follow the jailhouse policy of 
locking cell doors overnight.9  Parts II and III introduce the facts and holding 
of Walton and the legal context within which an analysis of the instant case 
may be framed.  Part IV synthesizes the court’s rationale in the Walton deci-
sion with the established legal context.  Finally, Part V discusses Walton’s 
foreseeable impact on future deliberate indifference claims.  This Note argues 
that the Eighth Circuit should adopt an objective standard when reviewing 
claims of deliberate indifference brought by pretrial detainees against jail 
officials. 
II.  FACTS AND HOLDING 
The defendants in this case were Macon County Jail administrator Da-
vid Moore and Macon County Sheriff Robert Dawson (hereinafter, collec-
tively “Officials”).10  These Officials were not the individuals actually re-
sponsible for locking the cell doors at the Macon County Jail on a nightly 
basis.11  In fact, they were not even present at the jail on the night the plaintiff 
(“Walton”) was sexually assaulted by his cellblock neighbor, Nathaniel 
Flennory (“Flennory”).12  On interlocutory appeal, the Officials argued that 
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, Northern 
Division, erred in denying both of them qualified immunity against Walton’s 
failure to train claims.13  Walton brought his claims against the Officials un-
der 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, which states in the pertinent part: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, 
custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, 
any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, 
 
 7. Id. at 1122. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. at 1109. 
 10. Jon Dwiggins, Nathaniel Flennory, Drew Belt, Alan Wyatt, and an unknown 
deputy were also joined as defendants in this action; however, this Note focuses only 
on the claims against Moore and Dawson.  See id. 
 11. Ryszard Bilinski was the jailer on duty the night of the assault.  See id. at 
1115. 
 12. See id. at 1114. 
 13. Id. 
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privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall 
be liable to the party injured in an action at law . . . .14 
Walton argued that the Officials violated his Fourteenth Amendment 
rights by failing to train jailer Ryszard Bilinski (“Bilinski”) to properly lock 
the cell doors at night, thereby failing to provide Walton with physical protec-
tion from Flennory.15  Walton asserted a Fourteenth Amendment violation 
rather than an Eighth Amendment violation16 because the Eighth Amendment 
applies only to post-conviction prisoners, whereas Walton was a pretrial de-
tainee at the time of the assault.17 
Walton’s detainment in the Macon County Jail stemmed from events 
that occurred in February 2010.18  He arrived at the jail on August 25, 2010, 
and was assigned to a cell in the same cellblock as Flennory.19  Flennory was 
a convicted rapist with a known history of sexual misconduct toward fellow 
inmates20 and was in the Macon County Jail at the time of the assault await-
ing transfer to the Missouri Department of Corrections to serve out a fifteen-
year sentence.21  Each cellblock at the Macon County Jail contained three 
individual cells.22  The cellblocks were self-contained, but each cell also had 
its own locking door.23  At the time when Flennory and Walton were held in 
the same block, they were housed in adjoining cells and had no other cell-
mates.24 
On May 31, 2010, three months before the assault took place, Flennory 
was disciplined for entering the unlocked cell of another inmate in the night 
 
 14. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). 
 15. Walton II, 752 F.3d at 1114. 
 16. The overwhelming majority of cases bearing facts similar to this one are 
brought by convicted prisoners under the Eighth Amendment.  A Jailhouse Lawyer’s 
Manual, COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 659 (9th ed. 2011), available at http://www3.law
.columbia.edu/hrlr/jlm/chapter-1.pdf. 
 17. Walton II, 752 F.3d at 1117. 
 18. On February 28, 2010, in Macon County, Missouri, Walton stole a truck, a 
gun, and cash.  Walton v. Dawson, No.2:11CV48 JCH, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
174884, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 11, 2012) [hereinafter Walton I] aff’d in part, rev’d in 
part and remanded, 752 F.3d 1109 (8th Cir. 2014).  He was eventually charged with 
three class C felonies under Section 570.030 of the Missouri Revised Statutes and 
later pled guilty to each, receiving a suspended execution of sentence.  Id. at *2 n.1; 
see MO. REV. STAT. § 570.030 (Cum. Supp. 2013).  At the time of his assault, Walton 
had not yet been arraigned on these charges.  Walton II, 752 F.3d at 1114. 
 19. See Walton II, 752 F.3d at 1114. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Walton I, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 174884, at *2 n.2.  Flennory pled guilty to 
one count of forcible rape on August 26, 2010.  Id. 
 22. See Defendant’s Exhibit EE (on file with the Missouri Law Review) (archi-
tectural drawing of Macon County Jail). 
 23. See id. 
 24. Interview with Stephen Wyse, Attorney, The Wyse Law Firm, in Columbia, 
Mo. (Sept. 24, 2014). 
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and “nibbl[ing] his penis over his clothes.”25  Flennory was confined to seg-
regation because of this incident until June 4, 2010, when he attempted sui-
cide.26  For the following eighteen days Flennory remained in a psychiatric 
center.27  He was transferred back to the Macon County Jail on June 22, 2010, 
and returned to the segregation unit at that time.28  However, due to a re-
newed display of suicidal tendencies, Sheriff Dawson returned Flennory to 
the general prison population several weeks later.29  On August 29, 2010, the 
day before the assault, Flennory passed Walton a sexually explicit note.30  
Walton took the note as a joke31 and did not bring it to the attention of any of 
the jail’s personnel.32  He simply flushed the note down his toilet.33 
The next morning, shortly before 4:00 a.m., and only five days after 
Walton had first arrived at the jail, Flennory entered Walton’s cell and fon-
dled him against his will.34  Flennory then induced Walton to go next door to 
Flennory’s cell, and Walton reluctantly complied.35  It was at this time that 
Bilinski arrived at their cellblock for a walk-through.36  When he reached 
Flennory’s cell, Walton did not say anything to Bilinski about the imminent 
assault.37  It was after Bilinski continued walking that Walton alleged 
Flennory sexually assaulted him.38  Bilinski performed one more walk-
through that morning, after the assault was over, and Walton maintained his 
silence towards the jailer once again.39  A short time later, another officer 
arrived at Walton’s cell with his breakfast.40  Walton gave this officer a note 
stating he had been raped.41 
 
 25. Walton I, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 174884, at *2. 
 26. See id. at *2. 
 27. Id. at *2-3. 
 28. Id. at *3. 
 29. Id.  Flennory was apparently returned to the general population “for his own 
safety and well-being.  Dawson warned Flennory that future infractions would result 
in a return to segregation, and Flennory indicated [his understanding].”  Id. (internal 
citation omitted). 
 30. Id. at *4. 
 31. Id.  Walton and Flennory had maintained a friendly rapport to this point and 
had even played cards together a few times since Walton’s arrival.  Id. at *3-4. 
 32. Id. at *4. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id.  Walton indicated that he complied with Flennory’s wishes out of fear 
that Flennory would kill him if he did not go.  Id. at *4 n.4. 
 36. Id. at *4. 
 37. Id. at *5. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id.  See also Walton v. Dawson, 752 F.3d 1109, 1129 (8th Cir. 2014) 
(Gruender, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  Bilinski performed a 
walkthrough every two hours at most.  Id. at 1120. 
 40. See Walton I, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 174884, at *5. 
 41. Id.  The Prison Rape Elimination Act defines rape as “carnal knowledge 
(contact between the penis and . . . the anus, including penetration of any sort, howev-
4
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In his complaint, Walton argued that prisoners have a reasonable expec-
tation of physical safety and protection from other inmates while incarcer-
ated.42  He claimed that locking cell doors at night, when constant supervision 
is not available, is a simple and effective way of preventing inmates’ access 
to one another.43  The complaint went on to say that when an overnight jailer 
fails to take such a step and states that the policy of locking the cells at night 
was never enforced prior to the instant assault, the management of the facility 
is called into question.44  Enduring sexual assault at the hands of another in-
mate has been equated to a form of “cruel and unusual punishment,” which is 
expressly prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.45  However, this interpreta-
tion has only been applied to persons already convicted of a crime.46  Because 
Walton was a pretrial detainee at the time of the assault, the Fourteenth 
Amendment was invoked instead.47  This amendment affords state pretrial 
detainees “rights which are at least as great as the Eighth Amendment protec-
tions available to a convicted prisoner.”48  Walton maintained that the Offi-
cials violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights through a showing of delib-
erate indifference to those rights.49  He contended that because the Officials 
were previously aware that the cell-locking protocol was not regularly fol-
lowed, they were aware of the risk posed by their inadequate training or su-
pervision.50 
The Officials responded to the allegations that they violated Walton’s 
constitutional rights by claiming they were entitled to qualified immunity in 
the matter.51  “[A] defendant official is entitled to qualified immunity unless 
(1) the facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, demonstrate 
the deprivation of a constitutional or statutory right; and (2) the right was 
 
er slight) . . . or sexual fondling of a person . . . [a]chieved through the exploitation of 
the fear or threat of physical violence or bodily injury.”  Kaufman, supra note 1 (em-
phasis added). 
 42. Amended Complaint at ¶ 34, Walton v. Dawson, 752 F.3d 1109 (8th Cir. 
2014) (No. 2:11CV48 JCH), 2012 WL 12090346. 
 43. See Walton II, 752 F.3d at 1119. 
 44. See id. at 1114. 
 45. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833-34 (1994). 
 46. Walton II, 752 F.3d at 1117 (“[T]he Eighth Amendment has no application 
until there has been a formal adjudication of guilt . . . .” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
 47. Walton had yet to be arraigned at the time of the assault and therefore de-
served to be shielded from punishment until he received due process.  Id. (“When [a 
defendant has] not been arraigned, much less convicted, the [U.S. Constitution 
shields] him not only from ‘cruel and unusual punishments,’ but from any punishment 
whatsoever.”). 
 48. Id. (quoting City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 1119. 
 51. Id. at 1114. 
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clearly established at the time of the deprivation.”52  The Officials maintained 
that they were entitled to summary judgment on the matter of qualified im-
munity because they were unaware that Bilinski was not locking the cell 
doors at night.53 
The district court denied the Officials’ motion for summary judgment in 
pertinent part.54  The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit 
heard the instant case on interlocutory appeal, with each official requesting to 
have his denial of qualified immunity reevaluated.55  The nature of this inter-
locutory appeal granted the reviewing court limited jurisdiction only to de-
termine whether there was a genuine violation of federal law and required the 
Eighth Circuit to accept as true the district court’s findings of fact.56  The 
Eighth Circuit held that in the pretrial detainee’s action for violation of his 
constitutional rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Officials’ motion 
for summary judgment was properly denied.57  The court concluded that the 
Officials were not entitled to qualified immunity when they knew that the jail 
cell doors were not being locked at night and that an obvious and substantial 
risk to inmate safety existed as a result.58 
III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution prohibits states 
from depriving any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of 
the law.59  This amendment is applicable to the states through the Due Pro-
cess clause.60  Generally, the Constitution prohibits only governmental in-
fringement of constitutional rights.61  Therefore, to find some action unconsti-
tutional, it is necessary to attribute the action to the state, which includes gov-
ernment agencies and officials acting under the color of state law.62  The U.S. 
Supreme Court has defined action taken “under color of state law” as the 
“[m]isuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only 
because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.”63  When a 
protocol is breached and a person’s constitutional rights are violated as a re-
 
 52. Id. at 1116 (emphasis added) (quoting Howard v. Kan. City Police Dep’t., 
570 F.3d 984, 988 (8th Cir. 2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 53. Id. at 1115. 
 54. Id. at 1114. 
 55. Id. at 1114-15. 
 56. In other words, the Eighth Circuit had no jurisdiction to weigh in on whether 
the district court’s determination of evidentiary sufficiency was correct.  Id. at 1116. 
 57. Id. at 1125. 
 58. Id. at 1124-25. 
 59. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 721 (1961). 
 62. Id. at 721-22. 
 63. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., Inc., 457 U.S. 922, 929 (1982). 
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sult, Section 1983 is typically invoked.  Municipal employees are state actors 
for purposes of Section 1983.64 
Section 1983 claims allege a constitutional deprivation of rights under 
one of two amendments.65  In a post-conviction context, regardless of wheth-
er the convict is a federal or state prisoner, the Cruel and Unusual Punishment 
Clause of the Eighth Amendment is invoked.66  In the case of pretrial detain-
ees, the federal-state distinction matters: Federal pretrial detainees assert their 
right to be protected under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 
whereas state pretrial detainees invoke due process under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.67  Where there is an action by a government officer whose be-
havior meets the requirements for state action, the Fourteenth Amendment is 
invoked.68 
A constitutional duty of care arises when an individual’s liberty has 
been restrained through the state’s affirmative exercise of power over him, 
rendering him unable to care for himself.69  Confinement to jail for the pur-
pose of awaiting arraignment restrains an individual’s liberty to the point 
where he is totally reliant upon agents of the state to provide the basic neces-
sities of life, such as food, sleep, and reasonable physical safety.70  In order to 
succeed on a Section 1983 claim against prison officials, a plaintiff must al-
lege and prove that the officials were deliberately indifferent toward his safe-
ty.71  The officials may in turn argue that they deserve qualified immunity in 
the matter – that is, that they can show they had no knowledge of the substan-
tial risk posed to the plaintiff and therefore should be immune from liability.72  
In order to better understand a Section 1983 claim of this nature, a look at the 
evolution of several aspects of the related law is necessary. 
A.  Constitutional Standard 
Federal civil rights violation statute Section 1983 has a long and varied 
history.  This statute “traces its origins back to Congress’ response to abuses 
suffered by African-Americans at the hands of state and local government 
officials in the post-Civil War South.”73  It originated as part of the Ku Klux 
 
 64. Jon Loevy, Section 1983 Litigation in a Nutshell: Make a Case Out of It!, 17 
J. DUPAGE CNTY. B. ASS’N (2004-05), http://www.dcbabrief.org/vol171004art2.html. 
 65. Randy Means, The History and Dynamics of Section 1983, POLICE CHIEF 
MAG. (May 2004), http://www.policechiefmagazine.org/magazine/index.cfm?fuseact-
ion=display_arch&article_id=299&issue_id=52004. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Loevy, supra note 64. 
 69. Dorothy J. v. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 7 F.3d 729, 732 (8th Cir. 1993). 
 70. Walton v. Dawson, 752 F.3d 1109, 1117 (8th Cir. 2014). 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Loevy, supra note 64. 
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Klan Act of 1871.74  Section 1983 remained in its original form for nearly 
ninety years, but was seldom utilized because at the time, a portion of the 
language used in the statute was interpreted to “exclude coverage of behav-
iors that were prohibited by the letter of state law” and other “technical legal 
problems.”75  This meant that Section 1983 could not be invoked in a claim 
against a government official who had violated a state law in the course of 
official dealings.76  “Section 1983 does not expand citizens’ substantive 
rights, but rather serves as the mechanism under which individuals may bring 
a private, civil cause of action for violations of their constitutionally protected 
rights (separate and apart from any rights they have in the criminal con-
text).”77 
Then, in 1961, the case of Monroe v. Pape was brought before the Su-
preme Court.78  The Court in Pape held that behavior in violation of the letter 
of state law was in fact actionable under Section 1983.79  Unfortunately, this 
change was still not enough to make Section 1983 actions more widely acces-
sible; a vast majority of potential plaintiffs meeting the criteria for an action-
able claim lacked the extensive financial resources needed to pursue their 
claims.80  Compounding the issue was that only “persons”81 could be sued 
under the statute, making the ultimate target – the deep pockets of the gov-
ernment – unreachable. 
The financial stalemate under Section 1983 was finally addressed in 
1978 when the Supreme Court heard Monell v. Department of Social Ser-
vices.82  This decision reversed the persons-only limitation of Monroe, ex-
tending liability under the statute to municipalities, cities, counties, and sub-
divisions.83  Additionally, Monell enabled a prevailing plaintiff to recover 
 
 74. This is known today as the Civil Rights Act of 1871.  Ku Klux Klan Act, 
FREE LEGAL DICTIONARY, http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/ku+klux+klan
+act (last visited Apr. 13, 2015). 
 75. Means, supra note 65. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Loevy, supra note 64. 
 78. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).  The plaintiffs in Monroe – a husband, 
wife, and their children – alleged that Chicago police officers broke into their home 
and searched it absent a warrant and then proceeded to detain and arrest the husband 
without a warrant or arraignment.  Id. at 169.  The plaintiffs brought their action 
against the officers under Section 1983, contending that the officers’ actions consti-
tuted a deprivation of their Constitutional rights.  Id. at 168-69.  The district court 
dismissed the complaint, citing failure to state a cause of action, and the Seventh 
Circuit affirmed the dismissal.  Id. at 170.  On a grant of certiorari, the Supreme Court 
reversed the dismissal.  Id. at 192. 
 79. Id. at 167. 
 80. Means, supra note 65. 
 81. At the time Monroe was decided, municipalities were not included within the 
definition of “persons.”  See id.; infra note 83 and accompanying text. 
 82. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S 658 (1978). 
 83. Id. at 690-91. 
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attorney’s fees from the defendant.84  These changes facilitated the evolution 
of aggrieved parties’ ability to feasibly sue the deep-pocketed entities whose 
agents caused the harm.85  “By definition, [so-called] Monell claims are not 
based on respondeat superior;86 rather, they are brought against the govern-
mental entity for injuries caused directly by the entity itself.”87  Asserting a 
Monell allegation allows a litigant to address, and thereby correct, violations 
of his civil rights resulting from a governmental entity’s policy or practice.88 
B.  Deliberate Indifference 
“At its core, the deliberate indifference standard attempts to define con-
duct that is more blame-worthy than simple negligence, but less egregious 
than intentional conduct.”89  This standard is the one most commonly used for 
establishing civil rights claims in the jail setting.90  Deliberate indifference 
can result in a substantial constitutional deprivation91 and can have conse-
quences that are life threatening.92  Given the serious nature of circumstances 
involving deliberate indifference, prison officials must continually evaluate 
the realities of in-custody violence.93 
In 1994, the Supreme Court heard Farmer v. Brennan, the landmark 
case among Section 1983 claims.94  The Court in Farmer articulated deliber-
ate indifference as the general standard by which to examine inmate-on-
inmate sexual assault claims brought against prison officials by convicted 
prisoners.95  In that case, an inmate alleged that prison officials violated his 
constitutional rights when they were deliberately indifferent to his safety.96  
The question presented under the Eighth Amendment was “whether prison 
 
 84. Id. at 697-99. 
 85. Means, supra note 65. 
 86. “A superior is responsible for any acts of omission or commission by a per-
son of less responsibility to him.”  Paul Montemayor, Moore v. Regents of University 
of California: Annotation, STAN. L. SCH. (May 31, 2013), http://scocal.stanford.edu/
opinion/moore-v-regents-university-california-31115 (citing Black’s Law Diction-
ary). 
 87. Loevy, supra note 64. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Deliberate Indifference, BRYAN & TERRILL LAW, PLLC, http://www.bryante-
rrill.com/deliberate-indifference/ (last visited Apr. 13, 2015). 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Alison Flowers, Dee Farmer Won a Landmark Supreme Court Case on In-
mate Rights. But that’s Not the Half of It., VILLAGE VOICE (Jan. 29, 2014), http://
www.villagevoice.com/2014-01-29/news/dee-farmer-v-brennan-prison-rape-
elimination-act-transgender-lgbt-inmate-rights/. 
 95. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). 
 96. Id. at 830-31. 
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officials, acting with deliberate indifference, exposed a prisoner to a suffi-
ciently substantial risk of serious damage to his future health.”97  The inmate 
argued that an objective, civil-style standard be employed to define the term, 
while the defendants asked the Court to construe the term in its subjective, 
criminal law form.98  The Court in Farmer chose to adopt a quasi-subjective 
standard, which required that “[t]he official must both be aware of facts from 
which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm 
exists, and he must also draw the inference.”99 
However, the Supreme Court has yet to specify whether deliberate indif-
ference is subjective or objective when a pretrial detainee brings a Fourteenth 
Amendment claim against a municipal jail official.100  The Eighth Circuit 
previously noted that “[it] has yet to establish a clear standard for pretrial 
detainees.”101  The Walton court determined that municipal liability on a de-
liberate indifference theory is purely objective and may be sufficiently prem-
ised on “obviousness or constructive notice.”102  Due to the myriad of incon-
sistencies in applying the deliberate indifference theory to Fourteenth 
Amendment claims, a circuit split developed as to whether the correct stand-
ard is one of objectiveness or subjectiveness in this context. 
C.  Qualified Immunity 
Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense that may be pleaded by a 
government official in defense of his official acts in a suit for civil damag-
es.103  In 1982, the Supreme Court decided Harlow v. Fitzgerald, sparking “‘a 
quiet revolution’ in the law governing the qualified immunity defense availa-
ble to state officials in [S]ection 1983 suits.”104  In order to receive qualified 
immunity, the public official must be able to show that he could have reason-
ably believed that his actions were constitutional under clearly established 
 
 97. Id. at 843 (quoting Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 98. Id. at 837. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Walton v. Dawson, 752 F.3d 1109, 1117 (8th Cir. 2014); see also Spencer v. 
Kanpheide Truck Equip. Co., 183 F.3d. 902, 905-06 (8th Cir. 1999). 
 101. Walton II, 752 F.3d at 1118 n.2 (quoting Morris v. Zefferi, 601 F.3d 805, 809 
(8th Cir. 2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 102. Id. at 1117 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 841) (internal 
quotation marks omitted); see also City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 
(1989). 
 103. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 802, 815 (1982).  The Supreme Court in 
Harlow held that presidential aides were not entitled to immunity as a blanket protec-
tion by virtue of their position and that they must show they did not reasonably know 
that their conduct violated clearly established constitutional rights.  Id. at 808-09, 
817-18. 
 104. Kit Kinports, Note, Qualified Immunity in Section 1983 Cases: The Unan-
swered Questions, 23 GA. L. REV. 597, 597 (1989). 
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law.105  This renders qualified immunity somewhat of an anomaly – igno-
rance of the law is virtually never excused in most other legal contexts.106  
The practical importance of qualified immunity decisions is immense.107  “On 
the one hand, qualified immunity protects public officials, allowing them to 
do their jobs without fear of liability.  But on the other hand, it can limit the 
ability of individuals to recover damages in many cases involving civil rights 
and civil liberties.”108 
Qualified immunity “protects government officials from lawsuits alleg-
ing that the officials violated plaintiffs’ rights, only allowing suits where offi-
cials violated a ‘clearly established’ statutory or constitutional right.”109  In-
deed, qualified immunity balances two significant interests.110  On the one 
hand is the “need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise 
power irresponsibly.”111  On the other hand is the “need to shield officials 
from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties 
reasonably.”112  Qualified immunity is an issue to be decided prior to trial in 
order to save state actors from the burden and expense of unnecessarily de-
fending themselves.113  The Supreme Court has been clear: where a finding of 
qualified immunity is proper, the lawsuit is to be dismissed as early as possi-
ble in order to avoid subjecting the state actor to discovery.114 
Whether qualified immunity applies to a certain situation involves de-
termining whether a constitutional right was clearly established.115  The Su-
preme Court has held that the determination should be measured by whether a 
reasonable person would have known the constitutional or statutory rules at 
the time.116  To contextualize the issue in a more practical sense, “a govern-
ment official who reasonably believes he is acting lawfully should be entitled 
to qualified immunity.”117 
 
 105. Barbara E. Armacost, Note, Qualified Immunity: Ignorance Excused, 51 
VAND. L. REV. 583, 583 (1998). 
 106. Id. 
 107. Stephen Wermeil, SCOTUS for Law Students: Qualified Immunity, 
SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 17, 2014, 1:18 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/02/scotus
-for-law-students-sponsored-by-bloomberg-law-qualified-immunity/. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Qualified Immunity: An Overview, LEGAL INFO. INST., http://www.law.corne-
ll.edu/wex/qualified_immunity (last visited Apr. 13, 2015). 
 110. See id. (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)). 
 111. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Loevy, supra note 64. 
 114. Wermeil, supra note 107. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
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IV.  INSTANT DECISION 
The limited-scope questions before the Eighth Circuit in this interlocuto-
ry appeal were (1) whether the district court properly denied summary judg-
ment to both officials regarding their assertions of qualified immunity and (2) 
whether a reasonable jury could potentially find in Walton’s favor.118  The 
district court initially denied summary judgment to both officials on this 
count because it found lingering questions of fact as to whether the defend-
ants had notice of Bilinski’s failure to lock the cells at night and if they were 
tacitly aware of, or else deliberately indifferent to, the behavior.119  The 
Eighth Circuit reviewed the decision for the purpose of deciding whether a 
reasonable jury could find in Walton’s favor.120  The district court’s findings 
of fact were all accepted as true, and all conclusions of law were reviewed de 
novo.121 
A.  Liability of the Jail Administrator 
The Eighth Circuit in Walton made it abundantly clear that enduring a 
sexual assault by another prisoner is grave enough to be considered a consti-
tutional deprivation and that the right at issue – that of a pretrial detainee to 
be protected from sexual assault by another inmate – is clearly established.122  
This well-settled standard left but one legal question for the Eighth Circuit to 
answer regarding the failure-to-train claim against Moore: “Do the facts, as 
found by the district court, permit a reasonable jury to find that Moore violat-
ed this clearly established right?”123 
In order to answer this question, the court employed the two-pronged 
test for knowledge set forth in Farmer v. Brennan.124  This test stipulates that 
an official’s knowledge of the substantial risk of serious harm need not be 
particularized.125  To be held liable for a constitutional violation, the official 
need only have failed to take reasonable steps to prevent a risk known to 
him.126  To satisfy the Farmer test, the court needed to establish that (1) 
Moore knew the jail cell doors were not being locked at night, and (2) that 
failure to lock the doors was an obvious and substantial risk to inmate safe-
ty.127 
 
 118. Walton v. Dawson, 752 F.3d 1109, 1114-22 (8th Cir. 2014). 
 119. Walton v. Dawson, No. 2:11CV48 JCH, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 174884, at 
*17 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 11, 2012). 
 120. See Walton II, 752 F.3d at 1122. 
 121. Id. at 1116. 
 122. Id. at 1118. 
 123. Id. (emphasis added). 
 124. Id. at 1119 (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 843-44 (1994)). 
 125. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 843-44. 
 126. Toone, supra note 2, at 54-55. 
 127. Walton II, 752 F.3d at 1119. 
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In establishing Moore’s knowledge under the first prong, the court 
looked to three primary pieces of evidence that it believed could allow a rea-
sonable jury to reject Moore’s testimony: (1) Bilinski’s uncontroverted state-
ment, which contradicted Moore’s own testimony; (2) that Moore personally 
worked in the jail, and that the doors were not being locked was so obvious 
that his presence in the jail alone was enough to substantiate knowledge; and 
(3) that Moore’s testimony was contradicted by the tone and content of Sher-
iff Dawson’s written reprimand to the jailhouse staff following Flennory’s 
assault on Walton.128 
Regarding the first piece of evidence, the court relied on Bilinski’s tes-
timony.129  He testified that his two releasing officers, one of whom was 
Moore, never questioned his noncompliance with the overnight cell-locking 
policy in the three months prior to the assault.130  After deducing this evi-
dence, the court determined that regardless of whether Moore ever repri-
manded Bilinksi for not locking the cell doors, his failure to ever verify that 
Bilinski was adhering to the policy was enough to establish that he should 
have known the cell doors were not being locked at night.131  The court noted 
that the subjective standard of Farmer does not make it acceptable for a jail 
administrator to operate under the guise of willful blindness.132 
The second piece of evidence on which the court relied to establish 
Moore’s knowledge was that the risk posed by Bilinski’s failure to lock the 
cell doors each night was so obvious that Moore, who worked in the jail, 
surely knew of the risk by virtue of its obviousness.133  Moore was one of two 
“releasing officers” for Bilinski’s shift, meaning that every fourth morning, as 
Bilinski was coming off duty, Moore took his place.134  The court concluded 
from this circumstance that a reasonable jury would be able to infer that 
Moore would see the cell doors were unlocked each morning when he arrived 
to relieve Bilinski.135 
The third piece of evidence the court examined in rejecting Moore’s tes-
timony was the tone and content of the written reprimand issued by Sheriff 
Dawson.136  In this reprimand, Dawson stated that “he had ‘learned from talk-
ing to [Moore] after the [assault that] some of the jailers have not been adher-
 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 844 (1994)) (“[A] prison offi-
cial . . . would not escape liability if the evidence showed that he merely refused to 
verify underlying facts that he strongly suspected to be true, or declined to confirm 
inferences of risk that he strongly suspected to exist.”). 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at 1119 n.4.; Interview with Stephen Wyse, Attorney, The Wyse Law 
Firm, in Columbia, Mo. (Nov. 19, 2014). 
 135. Walton II, 752 F.3d at 1119. 
 136. Id. 
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ing to the policy [of locking cell doors overnight] on a regular basis.’”137  The 
court found that Dawson’s admonishment of the jail staff supported an infer-
ence that Moore knew the door-locking policy was not being followed, but 
did not acknowledge or react to the issue until after the assault.138 
After reviewing the evidence for establishing knowledge under the first 
prong of the Farmer test, the court analyzed facts relating to the second prong 
– establishing that Moore knew his subordinate’s failure to lock the cell doors 
at night was an obvious and substantial risk to inmate safety.139  The court 
determined that Bilinski’s failure to lock the jail cell doors at night, and 
Moore’s failure to train him to do so, resulted in “an objectively obvious, 
substantial risk to detainees’ safety in the particular context of this jail.”140 
Here, the court turned to a discussion of constitutional guarantees of a 
detainee’s right to sleep and highlighted the fact that detainees are at their 
most vulnerable when asleep.141  In a recent opinion by the Second Circuit, 
conditions preventing sleep were held to amount to an Eighth Amendment 
violation.142  The court in Walton was required to consider “whether unlocked 
cell doors pose an unconstitutional risk to detainees, such that ‘potential vic-
tims dare[] not sleep’ or risk attack if they do.”143  The court noted that an-
swering this question depends on the specific circumstances of the prison in 
question and prison officials’ awareness regarding the risk.144  It also noted 
that prison officials are afforded great deference in determining how to best 
protect detainees charged under their care from the risk of nighttime as-
saults.145  However, an absolute failure to take preventive steps to avoid un-
constitutional safety risks violates the duty that a prison official has to protect 
an inmate from violence by other inmates.146 
The court concluded that the instant case was an example of such a fail-
ure.147  It found that Moore and the jailers did next to nothing, despite the 
policies in place that required frequent walk-throughs and nightly lock-
down.148  During nighttime hours, walkthroughs were infrequent149 and the 
cell doors were never locked.150  The court concluded that because of 
Flennory’s prior nighttime assault, the risk posed by leaving the cell doors 
 
 137. Id. (alteration in original). 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 1119-20. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. at 1120. 
 142. Walker v. Schult, 717 F.3d 119, 126 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 143. Walton II, 752 F.3d at 1120 (alteration in original) (quoting Hutto v. Finney, 
437 U.S. 678, 682 n.3 (1978)). 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id.; see also Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994). 
 147. Walton II, 752 F.3d at 1120. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. (finding that Bilinski performed a walkthrough every two hours, at most). 
 150. Id. 
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unlocked “was both obvious and known to the prison officials.”151  “Under 
the totality of the circumstances, failing to do anything to mitigate this risk – 
whether by locking doors, increasing cell checks, installing cameras, segre-
gating violent prisoners, or some other approach – potentially fell below min-
imum constitutional standards.”152 
The court pointed out that it placed an emphasis on Bilinski and 
Moore’s disregard for the door-locking policy because that policy represented 
the Macon County Jail’s decision of how to best prevent nighttime assaults 
from occurring.153  The policy was considered to be the best method in this 
particular context, given the outdated nature of the facilities.154  In response 
to the dissenting opinion in Walton,155 the majority expressed “no view re-
garding this jail’s choice among the wide variety of ways to protect detainees 
from nighttime attack.  [They merely reiterated] the officials’ long-
established obligation to implement some reasonable method . . . of protect-
ing non-violent detainees housed in close proximity to violent inmates.”156  
The court held that there was enough evidence adduced to satisfy the Farmer 
test and to allow a reasonable jury to potentially conclude that Walton should 
succeed on his failure-to-train claim against Moore.157 
B.  Liability of the Macon County Sheriff 
The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of qualified im-
munity for Sheriff Dawson, concluding that, as Macon County Sheriff, he had 
many responsibilities outside of the jailhouse walls and therefore was unlike-
ly to know as much about day-to-day operations and policy adherence as 
Moore did.158  Qualified immunity requires that each officer’s conduct be 
analyzed individually.159  The Eighth Circuit noted that “[e]ven if the district 
court [was] right that Sheriff Dawson may not have responded reasonably to 
Flennory’s earlier assault of another inmate, that factual question alone [was] 
an insufficient basis to deny qualified immunity under Farmer’s subjective 
standard.”160 
 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. at 1121. 
 154. Id. at 1122.  There were no cameras installed in the jail, and the facilities are 
over one hundred years old.  Interview with Stephen Wyse, supra note 134. 
 155. The dissenting opinion lamented that the majority was “impos[ing] a ‘one-
strike-you’re-out’ rule,” that cell doors must be locked as soon as “an inmate . . . has 
committed one prior in-jail assault and his neighbor looks concerned . . . .”  Walton II, 
752 F.3d at 1129 (Gruender, J., dissenting). 
 156. See Walton II, 752 F.3d at 1122. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. at 1125. 
 159. Id. (quoting Roberts v. City of Omaha, 723 F.3d 966, 974 (8th Cir. 2013)). 
 160. Id. 
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The court reasoned that it “is not enough to say that a factual question 
exists: the factual dispute must be both ‘genuine’ and ‘material.’”161  Because 
all of Walton’s proffered evidence related directly to the subjective 
knowledge of Moore, and not Dawson, the Eighth Circuit determined that 
Sheriff Dawson was in fact entitled to qualified immunity in this case and that 
he was not to be held responsible under a failure-to-train theory.162  After 
reviewing the record in an attempt to determine Dawson’s subjective 
knowledge of the risk that existed, the court concluded that there was nothing 
more than conjecture on which to base a denial of qualified immunity, and 
thus the district court’s denial of the defense to Dawson was reversed.163  In 
support of its decision on the matter, the court noted that “Dawson’s response 
to the sexual assault . . . [gave] every indication that he, unlike Moore, did not 
know inmates like Walton were in jeopardy.”164 
C.  Holding 
The Eighth Circuit, in a 2-1 decision, affirmed in part and reversed in 
part the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceed-
ings consistent with its opinion.165  The denial of qualified immunity to 
Moore was affirmed, and the denial of qualified immunity to Dawson was 
reversed.166  The Court found sufficient evidence existed to make it plausible 
for Walton to prove at trial that Bilinski’s failure to adhere to the overnight 
cell-locking policy gave rise to Moore’s failure-to-train liability under a de-
liberate indifference theory.167 
V.  COMMENT 
The court in Walton v. Dawson acknowledged that the Eighth Circuit 
has yet to adopt a formal stance on whether an objective or a subjective 
standard should be employed when evaluating deliberate indifference claims 
brought by state pretrial detainees under the Fourteenth Amendment.168  But-
ler v. Fletcher answered the question of whether deliberate indifference is the 
appropriate standard under the Fourteenth Amendment, but the meaning of 
the phrase – specifically, whether it is subjective or objective – was not con-
 
 161. Id. (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a)). 
 162. Id. at 1125-26. 
 163. Id. at 1126. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. at 1122-23.  This case went to trial in October 2014, and the jury found in 
favor of Walton.  Walton v. Dawson, No. 2:11CV48 JCH, 2015 WL 331628, at *1 
(E.D. Mo. Jan. 26, 2015). 
 168. Walton II, 752 F.3d at 1118. 
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tested.169  It was following Butler that the Eighth Circuit noted that it has not 
yet established a clear standard for pretrial detainees.170  Case law across the 
circuits has been vague and inconsistent in taking a stance on this issue.171  In 
evaluating Walton, the Eighth Circuit promulgated a subjective standard, as 
set forth in Farmer v. Brennan,172 because that was what it had always 
done.173  This action is in conflict with the approach that a majority of other 
circuits employ.  For example, the Seventh Circuit utilizes an ostensibly ob-
jective standard.174  Because the difference between the practical impacts of 
the two standards is virtually non-existent, the Eighth Circuit ought to join the 
majority of the circuits in formally adopting the objective standard for pretrial 
detainees’ claims of deliberate indifference against prison officials. 
It is noteworthy that convicted inmates who have brought deliberate in-
difference claims against jail and prison officials have enjoyed a fair success 
rate despite the subjective component of the Farmer two-pronged test.175  In 
fact, the Supreme Court has held that distinguishing between a subjective and 
an objective standard by which to judge deliberate indifference would serve 
little practical importance in the post-conviction context.176  The Court sup-
ported this reasoning by emphasizing that analyzing deliberate indifference 
claims under a subjective test would not allow prison officials to freely ignore 
dangers posed to the inmates under their supervision.177  Indeed, the requisite 
 
 169. Id. at 1117 (citing Butler v. Fletcher, 465 F.3d 340, 345 (8th Cir. 2006)). 
 170. Id. at 1118 (quoting Morris v. Zefferi, 601 F.3d 805, 809 (8th Cir. 2010)). 
 171. Catherine T. Struve, The Conditions of Pretrial Detention, 161 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1009, 1112 (2013). 
 172. Farmer v. Brennan, 11 U.S. 825, 829 (1994). 
 173. Walton II, 752 F.3d at 1117-18. 
 174. See Brown v. Budz, 398 F.3d 904 (7th Cir. 2005).  The plaintiff in Brown 
was a pretrial detainee at the time he was severely beaten by another inmate.  Id. at 
907.  The plaintiff brought a Section 1983 action against the jail employees and direc-
tors, whom the plaintiff alleged were deliberately indifferent towards his rights.  Id. at 
908.  He premised this argument on the fact that the officials were aware of the as-
sailant’s violent propensities and yet allowed him unsupervised access to the room in 
which the plaintiff was located.  Id.  The district court dismissed the case, citing the 
plaintiff’s failure to state a cause of action.  Id.  On appeal, the judgment was reversed 
and remanded for further proceedings.  Id. at 907.  The Seventh Circuit noted that 
prior to this case, it had often held that proof of deliberate indifference in this context 
required showing that the custodians knew that the specific detainee posed a threat to 
a specific victim, but clarified that the court was not in fact constrained to this fact 
pattern.  Id. at 915.  The appellate court ultimately concluded that deliberate indiffer-
ence “may also be predicated on the custodians’ knowledge of an assailant’s predato-
ry nature,” a distinct departure from the traditional subjective knowledge approach.  
Id. at 915 (emphasis added). 
 175. Id. 
 176. Christopher D. Man & John P. Cronan, Forecasting Sexual Abuse in Prison: 
The Prison Subculture of Masculinity as a Backdrop for Deliberate Indifference, 92 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 127, 135 (2002). 
 177. Id. at 134. 
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culpability required to get a deliberate indifference claim to a jury can be 
satisfied simply by showing “that a prison official knew of a substantial risk 
from the very fact that the risk was obvious.”178 
However, the problem with formally adopting the subjective standard 
for pretrial detainees follows from this train of thought.  Choosing a subjec-
tive interpretation leaves the door open for the official to show that obvious-
ness escaped him, therefore allowing him to evade liability.  This is problem-
atic because the Eighth Amendment protects against cruel and unusual pun-
ishment.179  A pretrial detainee is an individual who has not yet received a 
formal adjudication of guilt and therefore must not be subject to punishment 
of any kind.180  Allowing a pretrial detainee’s claims to be evaluated in a sub-
jective context creates too wide a scope for the defendant official to evade 
liability where a person was subjected to such cruel and unusual punishments 
by way of the official’s inaction.  For claims brought by a pretrial detainee, 
for whom a judicial determination of probable cause has yet to be established 
as the basis for his detainment, an objective standard of deliberate indiffer-
ence should apply. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The Eighth Circuit correctly decided the issues before it in the Officials’ 
interlocutory appeal by denying them summary judgment as to the plaintiff’s 
claim of deliberate indifference.  A pretrial detainee is to be afforded protec-
tions under the Fourteenth Amendment at least as great as those given to con-
victed prisoners under the Eighth Amendment.  When a detainee is not 
availed of these protections due to the failure of jailhouse personnel to act 
reasonably in guarding his safety, a court is correct to conclude that questions 
of fact remain as to whether a jury could reasonably find in the plaintiff’s 
favor. 
Though the court’s conclusion was reached under a subjective standard 
– that is, that the Officials had actual knowledge of the fact that the cell doors 
were not being locked at night181 – the Eighth Circuit should formally adopt 
an objective standard by which to judge deliberate indifference claims of 
pretrial detainees in the future.  This standard would best serve the constitu-
tional interests of those detainees who have yet to be arraigned and would 
prompt jailhouse officials to adhere to more specific policies relating to this 
particular class of inmates.  That personnel should retain wide deference in 
how to best protect inmates from danger is not a point of contention; the 
problem arises when they do not take even the most basic steps necessary to 
reasonably prevent inmate-on-inmate assault.  Failure to take such steps too 
 
 178. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 842 (1994). 
 179. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
 180. Walton v. Dawson, 752 F.3d 1109, 1117 (quoting City of Revere v. Mass. 
Gen. Hosp., 436 U.S. 239, 244 (1983)). 
 181. Id. at 1119. 
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often results in detainees and prisoners becoming victims of sexual assault.  
Adopting an objective standard would send a clear message that preventing 
sexual assault in American jails and prisons requires active participation by 
personnel, and, further, that no one – regardless of their offender status – 
should have to endure sexual violence while in custody. 
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